The seminar takes place both in presence and online via teams.

abstract: Weevaluate whether revealing wage information in job vacancies is able to changethe gender wage gap. In 2011, the Austrian Equal Treatment Law mandated everyvacancy   to include a minimum wage offer. This mandatory wageinformation makes the employer's willingness to pay and the value of outsideoptions more salient to job applicants, thus changing bargaining options.Our general results showa small effect of the provision of wage information, reducing the gender gapsomewhat.  Taking up the bargaining argumentation, we split the sampleinto vacancies where a higher or a lower bargaining power of firms is to beexpected and find a strong and significant reduction of the gender wage gap forjobs which are immediately available and need to be filled urgently. The effectis driven by an increase in female wages. There is no such effect for jobspositions which are not urgently vacant. There is no evidence for changes in vacancycharacteristics, meaning the estimated effects come from the provision of wageinformation rather than different job descriptions and amenities offers. Wealso show that effects are unlikely to come from changes in the composition ofemployees and firms as well as from increased returns to labor marketexperience.